In preparation for writing this, I watched an animated version of Goodnight, Moon.

          It’s really not anything new to make fun of the United Nations. We do it because we love them; it’s adorable, like watching children play at being adults, except that it’s diplomats playing at being a world government. Nations that insist on being enemies with one another, most notably anybody who considers themselves an enemy of the West, regularly fail to listen to UN resolutions, feeling persecuted by an organization that they can’t help but notice draws 22% of it’s funding from the United States. The United States, on the other hand, feels as though the UN is ineffective, and had recently been thinking of once again withholding dues as a measure to demand improved UN effectiveness, and as an activity to partner with the constant complaining about bias against the US and Israel. On top of that, everybody with a permanent seat on the Security Council relentlessly abuses their power of veto, making serious action on the part of the UN impossible in most cases. You’ve probably figured it out by now, but today’s topic is UN reform.
          The United Nations has its roots in the period immediately following the First World War. Power bloc politics had failed to be the instrument for peace that many had hoped, resulting as it had in the most horrifying war in human history. As a result, as the Treaty of Versailles was drafted, a fundamentally new approach to creating lasting peace was tried: the League of Nations. Formed in 1919, the League was at the height of it’s power and effectiveness in the years leading up to 1935, having grown to encompass 58 member states and resolved several territorial disputes generated in the aftermath of the Great War successfully. A string of failures to check the aggression of Axis powers in the 30s, however, ultimately resulted in the Second World War and the demise of the League, though it officially remained in operation until its final meeting in 1946.
          Established in 1945, the United Nations was meant by the dying League of Nation’s most prominent members to be its successor. First discussed in 1944, it was decided at the Yalta Conference that initial membership would be open to any nation that joined the Allies by March of 1945, netting the new world organization 51 members buy the time its charter was ratified in October of that year. In the intervening 65 years, the United Nations first presided over the Cold War, during which tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union sometimes seemed destined to tear the UN apart, and then the new age of interventionalist peacekeeping in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Today, the UN is made up of 192 member states, and faces both significant criticism and the growth of an assumed mandate to intervene in some of the most difficult-to-resolve conflicts on the planet without adequate means, political or material.
          The tenure of Kofi Annan as Secretary General created a new hope for the UN as an effective organization, free of the criticism that the five permanent members of the Security Council had undue influence because a Secretary General with vigor and aplomb was in office. I’m not sure why, but I’ll get to that in a minute. Depending on who you listen to, Ban Ki Moon has been a force for regression in an age where the legitimacy leant by the United Nations has become increasingly important. Both of these views ignore the fact that the UN’s problems are almost entirely structural or economic in nature.
          It’s been suggested before that significant reform of the United Nations would be required in order to increase its effectiveness in any role other than that of aid organization. This is largely correct, I think, but as a practical solution it has several problems. The most obvious reform to make is increasing the membership of the Security Council, as well as reforming the veto powers of the permanent members. Several candidates have been suggested for new permanent membership, including Germany, Japan, Brazil, or India, alongside proposals to admit an African nation, the serious contenders usually being listed as Egypt, Nigeria, or South Africa. There are serious problems with this as a solution to the UN’s ills, however. The opposition of the permanent members to reform is typically cited as the main obstacle to an effective UN, but this is disingenuous.
          At its root, the problem with this as a solution is that no matter how many members you add, the retention of veto powers by any member of the Security Council necessarily means that the strategic concerns of those nations are unduly represented. Ostensibly the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution in 1950 meant vetoing members have no power to stop the General Assembly from doing as it sees fit, but the sad fact is that this isn’t true. Quite apart from the fact that the tremendous diplomatic, military, and economic power of P5 gives them undue influence over the proceedings of the UN, power of veto gives the nations that have it the ability to exert undue influence over the text of Security Council resolutions with the threat “do something more to our liking if you want to get anything done at all”.
          You know what, though? The UN’s real problem, as I suggested above, is economic, both in terms of literal cash-flow, and in terms of general material ability. It’s obvious that the UN’s aid organizations, arguably their most effective arm, could use more money, because they always do. As an organization for intervention on behalf of the international community, however, more money could really increase the credibility of the UN; according to RAND, the UN enjoys a ratio of seven successes for every one failure in its nation building endeavors, while the US clocks in an at embarrassing two for one.
          The idea that the UN could increase its legitimacy and influence over foreign affairs through increasing funding to its effective branches is beguiling, and suggests a potentially problematic, but somehow appealing solution to the General Assembly’s lack of authority. Is the inability to get member states to contribute troops getting you down? Pay them. Make it contingent on behavior that won’t make the General Assembly regret paying these troops to be peacekeepers. Think about this in the context of regional intervention: you know what would probably increase the number of African Union peacekeepers in Somalia? Not only that, but the increase in authority over regional events would likely create new power structures within the General Assembly, ultimately balancing the undue influence that’s held by the P5 regardless of the veto.
          This has some obvious problems, not the least of which are the potential for abuse of this system by already powerful member states, ethical concerns over what could easily be characterized as hiring mercenaries, the practical concerns of creating mercenary economies in the third world (if you thought that Somalia’s pirate economy was bad, just wait), and the potential for the use of such a system to compel troops from nations by withholding aid. It’s just an example of what the UN might be able to do to increase its autonomy from P5 nations if it had more than the usual $2.5ish billion that usually comprises its biannual(!) operating budget. The simple fact is that a significant increase to the General Assembly’s spending power alone might be enough to begin a trend of increased independence from the influence of the Security Council veto and the nations that hold it.
          Not that this is easy either. It’s facile to point out that the US could cut annual defense spending but just about one sixth of one percent and double the UN’s operating budget. This is true, but the fact is that UN dues are already determined by ability to pay; the United States does not pay higher dues because they have reached the contribution cap, which is set at 22% of the UN’s budget. If you reread that last sentence carefully, you should come to the correct conclusion: the cap is set as a percentage of the UN’s budget rather than a percentage of the member’s GDP because the cap exists to prevent undue influence over UN proceedings, rather than to protect the most powerful members from disproportionate dues. The US negotiating the reduction in the cap from 25% to 22% just before the turn of the millenium, for those that might be about to bring it up, was definitely to give the appearance that the UN was conceding something, not because the US is worried about the money.
          The United States could increase the budget of the UN by a factor of ten without breaking a sweat, but how much credibility would the UN hold once it had become an outgrowth of US defense spending? This problem is, however, what makes me sort of hopeful for the future of the United Nations. Just as developing nations across Africa and Asia are beginning to become trans-regional powers, their stake in the UN, both financial, and as a result political, is growing. As more nations become developed countries, the P5s influence in the General Assembly will shrink, and the increased material ability could make the General Assembly strong enough to actually enforce the idea that the P5 veto can’t stop effective action. Maybe it will be a while before these new power blocs are able to balance out the current elite, but maybe not.